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Executive Summary  What makes a test score? There is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the exact contribution of school quality, pupil background, and peers in educational achievement. If peers make most of the difference, then diversity and heterogeneous classrooms may narrow the gap between high‐ and low‐performing students. If pupil background is the first determinant of achievement, then targeting pupils and families may reduce inequalities. If schools make most of the difference, then school quality should be a policy priority. The educational literature in the U.K. and in the U.S. has long argued that schools make less difference than individual determinants or peers. However, most of these analyses relied on fairly basic measures of school quality, such as schools’ financial resources. In this paper, we estimate the respective contributions of pupils, schools and peers without relying on proxies for school quality. We estimate the contribution of each school and pupil to Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2 test scores. We also estimate peer effects, that is, the effect of ethnic groups, of special needs students, of free school meal students, and boys on individual achievement.  The paper suggests that most of educational inequalities are pupil‐specific inequalities. The variance of test scores is mostly explained by the pupil effect. School quality is the second determinant of educational achievement. Finally, peer effects are significant but explain a small share of overall inequalities at ages 7 and 11. The paper also shows that test scores and value‐added as published in the league tables are not an accurate measure of school quality. Value‐added at Key Stage 2 cannot be entirely attributed to school quality. Our paper provides methods that may lead to better and more precise estimates of school quality. 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1 Introduction
A key question for education policy is which of the many educational inputs - including social
background, schools, peers and teachers - really make a difference? Accurately determing an answer
is crucial to good decision-making in education. Indeed, in the real world context of limited funding
there is a trade-off between a range of education policies like targeting pupils, targeting schools,
promoting desegregation, implementing tracking, hiring and promoting good teachers. Choosing
between alternative policy strategies very clearly requires some knowledge on the relative impact of
schools, pupil abilities, family background and peers on educational achievement. If schools make a
difference then changing school inputs, management and teaching practices can enhance educational
performance. If, on the other hand, peers are more important, segregation may be the number one
issue to tackle. Finally, if pupils’ ability or background - more generally pupil-specific issues - are
the principal determinants of achievement, policies targeting low achieving pupils may have the
highest potential to narrow achievement gaps between children.
However, there remains no real consensus on what really makes a difference despite these issues
being hotly debated for a long time (Summers and Wolfe, 1977). This is partly because the questions
of how to identify these different effects are very challenging from an empirical viewpoint. This
said, there are some stylised facts that emerge from different strands of the literature. For example,
scholars in the sociology of education have long argued that, apart from students’ ability and
background, peers are the most important determinant of test scores. This dates back at least as
far as the Coleman (1966). In The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity (1969), Coleman
asserts that:
[...] those inputs characteristics of schools that are most alike for Negroes and whites
have least effect on their achievement. The magnitudes of differences between schools
attended by Negroes and those attented by whites were as follows: least, facilities and
curriculum; next, teacher quality; and greatest, educational backgrounds of fellow stu-
dents. The order of importance of these inputs on the achievement of Negro students is
precisely the same: facilities and curriculum least, teacher quality next, and backgrounds
of fellow students, most.
Following the Coleman report, a series of desegregation programs were initiated – notably busing
programs. Furthermore the report sparked a significant research venture on the effects of peers,
school quality and pupil backgrounds on achievement (Coleman, 1975; Clotfelter, 1999; Guryan,
2001).
However, a number of papers by economists have challenged some of the key findings from the
report and the research literature it stimulated. A seminal paper (Manski, 1993) highlighted the
main problems of the baseline specification used by James Coleman. Selection bias is the most
important one: if we observe good pupils together, are they good because they are together or are
they together because they are good? Students may be partly selected on unobservable character-
istics. Moreover, Manski (1993) and Manski (2000) pointed out that it is hard to disentangle the
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effect of peers’ behaviour from the effect of peers’ characteristics. The other significant observation
is that the econometrician needs to address the issue of simultaneity bias since students influence
each other simultaneously. Hoxby (2000a) has estimated the overall effect of race and gender com-
position on Texas primary school pupils. She finds significant and large peer-effects. In the context
of the Boston METCO desegregation program, Angrist and Lang (2002) estimate the effect of mi-
nority students on test scores. Their estimated effects are modest and short-lived. Gould, Lavy and
Paserman (2004) assess the impact of immigrants on Israeli pupils. Even though the average effects
report are not statistically significant, they do find that low-achieving pupils are more sensitive to
their peers.
Another strand of the literature has focused on the relationship between school quality and
achievement. Typically school quality has been proxied by various observable indicators like the
teacher-pupil ratio, teacher education, teacher experience, teacher salary or expenditures per pupil.
Overall, despite it being a controversial and contested issue, the link between school resources and
test scores appears to be relatively weak (Hanushek, 1986; Hanushek, 2003; Krueger, 2003). The
‘school effectiveness’ research, carried out mostly by educationalists, comes to a similar conclusion:
schools matter, but not by anywhere near as much as non-school factors like the home environment
(Mortimore, Sammons, Stoll, Lewis and Ecob, 1988; Stiefel, Schwartz, Rubenstein and Zabel, 2005;
Teddlie and Reynolds, 1999; West and Pennell, 2003). In the British context, Levacic and Vignoles
(2002) mention that the impact of school resources is small and very sensitive to misspecification.
Dearden, Ferri and Meghir (2002) suggest that, while the pupil-teacher ratio has no significant
impact, attending selective schools improves both attainment and wages.
In this area Hanushek (1986) has stated
‘Schools differ dramatically in quality, but not for the rudimentary factors that many
researchers (and policy makers) have looked to for explanation of these differences.’
(Hanushek, 1986)
In a recent paper, Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005) indeed argue that test scores are the sum of
student, school and teacher effects. Since these are potentially unobservable, they strongly argue
that analysis should therefore not solely rely on observable characteristics for the estimation of
school and teacher effectiveness. However, they do not try to identify all the different components
of their favored specification.
Like the innovative Hanushek, Rivkin and Kain work, the focus of our paper is rather different
to the peer group and school quality work that tends to focus on a single issue. Rather we attempt
to measure the relative contributions of pupils, schools and peers without restricting our analysis
to observable proxies for peers’ characteristics or school quality. To do so we set up an empirical
framework which enables us to jointly estimate time-varying school fixed effects (school-grade-year
effects) and pupil fixed effects. The former are then decomposed into an observable time-varying
part (the social composition) and an unobservable school effect.
Our estimation strategy combines ideas from the literature using matched worker-firm data
(Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999) and from work in the economics of education (e.g. Hoxby,
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2000a). Our data has pupils matched to the schools they attend over time. Therefore, following
Abowd et al. (1999), pupil and school effects are identified using school switchers, assuming in
particular that mobility decisions are not motivated by time-varying pupil-specific shocks. Following
Hoxby (2000a), we argue that variations in the average quality of pupils within a school across
consecutive years are essentially idiosyncratic, because demographics change randomly from year to
year around a central tendency. From a methodological standpoint, our paper goes further than the
previous literature in at least two important dimensions: (i) it assesses the relative contribution of
peers, school quality and pupils’ ability and background using a single equation; and (ii) it estimates
the overall effect of peers without relying on specific peer characteristics.
We implement the empirical framework using an extremely rich administrative database on
English pupils in state schools. We use three cohorts of English pupils in state schools.1 The dataset
follows all pupils from primary to secondary education. England also has a national curriculum with
an associated national testing schedule. The outcomes we consider are national test scores (Key
Stage 1, taken in Year 2 at age 6/7, and Key Stage 2, taken at the end of primary school in Year
6 at age 10/11). The grades achieved at the end of these Key Stages are particularly important
instruments for both parents and the English education authorities. In particular, government uses
them to set targets and parents can freely read about them in performance league tables, published
on the web or in the popular press.
Our estimation results show pupil heterogeneity to be a more important determinant of achieve-
ment than school quality, even though both inputs are statistically significant. Peer effects are
mostly small, but also significant. We assess the robustness of our assumptions in a number of ways
and examine the mobility patterns in the data, with particular care placed on the reasons for pupil
mobility (importantly distiguishing between compulsory moves due to the structure of the English
school system and non-compulsory moves). These robustness tests largely confirm that conditioning
on person effects and on school-grade-year effects is a reasonable strategy.
The finding that pupil effects matter most is, of course, important in the light of research arguing
that early interventions (often pre-school) yield higher educational achievement returns (Heckman
and Masterov, 2007). If such policies aimed at dampening down achievement gaps on entry (or
early on) in primary school do indeed work best then our findings suggest that this is likely to have
an important impact on subsequent gaps and inequalities in educational achievement that occur
throughout the compulsory school years. But our findings also show there to be important, albeit
smaller, contributions of peers and schools to the variance of pupil achievement and therefore that
educational differences do evolve during children’s school careers. Evidently this matters for the
design of education policies at different stages of compulsory schooling.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the various specifications
we consider, as well as the estimation strategy we implement for each specification. In each case,
discussion of the specification is related to relevant papers in the associated literature. Section
1The data are census data on pupils in state schools - this comprises the vast majority of English school children.
Only around 7 percent receive their education outside of the state sector in private schools (and the percentage is
even lower in the primary schooling stage we study).
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3 introduces the reader to the specific English policy context and describes the dataset. Section
4 analyzes the regression results. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the estimation, examines
mobility patterns and gives some public policy implications of the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Econometric Framework
2.1 Specifications
In this section we introduce the various econometric models from which we extract estimates of the
relative importance of different educational inputs. The plan is to empirically implement them in
the context of primary school children in England, although of course our approach would (broadly)
carry over to other institutional settings.
The compulsory school careers of English children are organised into four Key Stages: Key
Stages 1 and 2 which take place in primary school; and Key Stages 3 and 4 in secondary school.
Our focus is on primary schools where Key Stage 1 examinations are taken at age 6/7 (grade 2)
and Key Stage 2 examinations at the end of primary school at age 10/11 (grade 6).2
To begin note that, as inter alia Rivkin et al. (2005) and Todd and Wolpin (2003) point out,
academic achievement at any point in a pupil’s education is a cumulative function of endowments
(ability and family background), of school quality, and of the environment (community, in particu-
lar). This implies that: (i) test scores are a function of these educational inputs; (ii) these inputs
can vary over time; and (iii) educational production functions should include the whole history of
inputs that shaped each pupil’s experience. The current section presents four different specifications
that incorporate some or all of these features, as depicted below:
yi,f,t = xi,f ,tβ + θi + ψJ(i,t) + εi,f,t (SE)
yi,f,t = xi,f ,tβ + θi + ϕJ(i,t),g(i,t),t + εi,f,t (SGYE)
yi,f,t = xi,f ,tβ + θi + ϕJ(i,t),g(i,t),t + λϕJ(i,t−1),g(i,t−1),t−1 + εi,f,t (PSGYE)
And the last specification,
yi,f,t = xi,f ,tβ + (1 + λ(t− 1)) · θi + ϕJ(i,t),g(i,t),t + λϕJ(i,t−1),g(i,t−1),t−1 + εi,f,t (PIE)
In each of these specifications, there are two Key Stage periods t = 1, 2, i denotes the N pupils
with i = 1, . . . , N ; j denotes the J schools with j = 1, . . . , J . yi,f,t is the test score of pupil i at time
t in examination topic f . J(i, t) denotes the school pupil i attended at time t and g(i, t) denotes
the grade in which pupil i attends in year t.
2Ideally, we would like to estimate the model up to key stage 4, but we would need to follow at least two cohorts
from key stage 1 to key stage 4 and currently the dataset follows only one cohort all the way through school careers.
Future releases of the National Pupil Database will include multiple cohorts from key stage 1 to key stage 3 and above.
5
The first specification (SE) is the same as that analysed in the worker-firm study of Abowd et
al. (1999). In (SE) the test score is decomposed into a pupil effect θi, a school effect ψJ(i,t), xi,f ,tβ
is the effect of the K time-varying covariates, and εi,f,t the residual3. The covariates are controls
for cohorts, years and exam subjects. The main advantage of specification (SE) is its simplicity.
However, it does not take into account the fact that school-specific inputs can vary over time.
For instance, teachers may be different from one year to the other and the student body of the
school changes. To take into account this feature, specification (SGYE) therefore generalises this
by positing that achievement is the sum of a student effect and a school-grade-year effect.
Specifications (SE) and (SGYE) remain restrictive in that they assume the only input that
affects outcomes at different stages of the educational curriculum is pupil ability. So, for example,
the quality of the teachers or the environment at the initial stage does not affect future outcomes.
It is likely however that some features of the school (or school-grade-year) that a pupil attended in
the past (Key Stage 1, date t− 1) have an impact on test scores at date t. This feature is captured
in Specification (PSGYE) which states that test scores are the sum of a student effect, the current
school-grade-year effect and the past school-grade-year effect discounted by λ. Because we do not
observe grades before Key Stage 1, we constrain the initial past school-grade-year effect to be equal
to zero, ϕj,g,0 = 0. At this initial date, the school-grade-year effect and the pupil effect θ cannot
be separately identified given the data. Notice that, in the same fashion as in value-added models,
this specification constrains the current and past effect of schools to be proportional (Todd and
Wolpin, 2003).
Finally, there is one last issue remaining in specification (PSGYE), namely the child’s progress
only depends on the school and not on his/her ability. The most general specification (PIE) allows
progress of the child to depend both on the child’s ability and his/her past and current schools.
It also allows us to assess the long run effect of schools on achievement. If λ is estimated to be
nonzero, schools have an effect not only on current achievement but also on achievement in the next
period (i.e. grade 6 at the end of Key Stage 2 in our study context).
2.2 Identification Hypotheses
The identification of specifications (SE), (SGYE), (PSGYE), (PIE) requires both sufficient mobility
and exogeneous mobility, both of which are defined in this sub-section, in addition to the traditional
exogeneity of the other covariates. In addition to this, we will assume that at least one of our
specifications is correct. For instance, if the true model involves a pure match effect, namely an
unobserved component specific to both the pupil and the school because, say, some schools are
better suited to more able pupils, then our estimates would have no clear meaning. We need to rule
this possibility out.4
3Of course, in Abowd et al. (1999) the effects were firms (our schools) and workers (our pupils).
4Education is an interaction between teachers and students, between schools and students. It is therefore quite a
limitation of fixed effects models that they do not allow for complementarities between schools and students. This is
very much ongoing research. Woodcock (2007) and Woodcock (2008) estimate a model of wage decomposition with
worker, firm and match effects, at the cost of additional assumptions on the correlation structure between match
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Notations: i, i′, i′′ are pupils. j, j′, j′′, j′′′ are schools or school-grade-years. Reading: i connects school j and
school j′ because i attends school j in the first period, and i attends school j′ in the second period.
Figure 1: (a) Sufficient mobility – The mobility graph has only one connex component. (b) Mobility
is not sufficient – The mobility graph has two connex components, {j, j′} and {j′′, j′′′}.
Mobility is defined as sufficient when the mobility graph for pupils and schools is connected
(Abowd et al., 1999; Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz, 2002). Two schools are connected if and only if
at least one pupil has attended both schools in different years. The set of all these connections is
the mobility graph, and we say that it is connected when it has only one connex component. This
is illustrated in figure 1.
Moreover, exogeneity assumptions specific to our model with pupil and school effects are re-
quired (Abowd et al., 1999; Abowd et al., 2002). A threat to identification arises if, for instance,
unmeasured unemployment shocks affect mobility and have an effect (e.g. through reduced income)
on outcomes (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2003). For this example, assume those families who experience
an unemployment shock between the two periods are more likely (i) to make their child move to
a bad school and (ii) to experience lower test scores due to their parents’ joblessness, then the
difference between bad and good schools might be underestimated.
To better understand why sufficient and exogenous mobility are jointly needed, consider the set
of pupils who attend school j in period 1 and school j′ in period 2. This mobility is clearly necessary
since these movements allow the identification of the relative effectiveness of school j with respect
to school j′. Ignoring the effect of covariates for the sake of clarity, this gives:
E[∆yi,f |i, J(i, 2) = j′, J(i, 1) = j] = ψj′ − ψj
+ E[∆εi,f |i, J(i, 2) = j′, J(i, 1) = j] (1)
with ∆yi,f = yi,f,2 − yi,f,1 and ∆εi,f = εi,f,2 − εi,f,1. With exogenous mobility, E[∆εi,f |i, J(i, 2) =
effects and other fixed effects.
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j′, J(i, 1) = j] = 0, the last term of the sum drops. This is potentially where unemployment shocks,
divorce, etc. could make trouble. Exogenous mobility rules this possibility out. Now, given this
assumption, if ψj is identified then ψ′j is identified.
It is then easy to see that when the mobility graph has only one connex component, choosing
one arbitrary school  and one arbitrary pupil ı and setting their effects ψ and θı to zero identifies
all school and pupil effects. A formal definition of the mobility graph and the identification of the
model are detailed in appendix A.
So far our intuition has been built on the simplest specification SE. Introducing school-grade-
year effects in specifications (SGYE) and (PSGYE) not only allows more flexibility in the measure-
ment of school effectiveness, it also introduces more pupil mobility, since pupils necessarily change
year-group between the two periods. In addition, because school-grade-year effects time-vary, the
exogeneity assumptions are weaker than before. Model (SGYE) is a particular case of (PSGYE) in
which the discounting factor is set to 0. Again, identification conditions are identical.
2.3 Identification of Peer Effects
Once we have estimated school-grade-year effects, we would also like to disentangle the effect of
the social composition of the school-grade-year from the other inputs under plausible identifying
conditions. Identification of such peer effects is challenging. The main issues are described in Manski
(1993). First, students may be sorted partly based on unobservable characteristics – for instance,
teachers and students may not be randomly matched. Second, students influence each other which
means it is hard to disentangle the effect of one on the other; in other words, there is a simultaneity
bias. And third, it is hard to identify the effect of peers’ characteristics from the effect of peers’
behaviour.
We assume, as in Hoxby (2000a) and Gould et al. (2004), that the year-to-year variations in
school-grade-year composition are exogenous, essentially because of the randomness of the demo-
graphics. For instance, in the case of ethnic peer effects, plus or minus one black caribbean student
in a given year is probably an idiosyncratic variation. We therefore regress the school-grade-year
effect on a school identifier and the composition of the school-grade-year.
ϕj,g,t = ψj + Eˆ(z|j, g, t)γ + νj,g,t (2)
For each school-grade-year j, g, t, Eˆ(z|j, g, t) denotes the vector of average student characteristics,
for instance the fraction of boys, the fraction of blacks, the fraction of free school meal students. This
strategy is likely to capture most of the bias due to non-random sorting of students between schools,
essentially assuming that there is no correlation between changes in school-grade-year composition
and unobservable school inputs.
Formally, year-to-year variations in school-grade-year student composition should be exogenous
conditional on the school-by-grade fixed effect. Variations in school-grade-year composition should
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not be correlated with unobserved time-varying school characteristics.
E[νj,g,t=2 − νj,g,t=1|Eˆ(z|j, g, t = 2)− Eˆ(z|j, g, t = 1)] = 0 (3)
Eˆ(z|j, g, t = 2) − Eˆ(z|j, g, t = 1) is the year-to-year variation in school-grade-year composition.
νj,g,t=2 − νj,g,t=1 represents unobserved time-varying shocks in school quality.
This hypothesis adresses the issue of the selection bias. The simultaneity bias is adressed through
the use of a common school-grade-year effect for all students. Students “share” the same local public
good, which includes peer-effects.
However we are not able to separately identify the effect of peers’ characteristics and the effect
of peers’ behaviour. Thus the vector of social interactions γ captures both of these peer-effects.
Thus in (6) γ is the reduced form peer-effect.
2.4 Decomposing Inequalities
The models we have specified allow us to decompose inequalities of test scores and test score gaps
into components attributed to schools, peers and pupils’ ability and background. We can do this
since test scores are the sum of the pupil effect, the year-group effect and the past year-group effect.
In our KS2 and KS1 models, these can be written:
y2 = θ + ϕ2 + λϕ1 + ε2
y1 = θ + ϕ1 + ε1
where indices have been dropped for the sake of clarity. Moreover, school-grade-year effects can be
decomposed into a permanent school effect and the effect of school composition:
ϕ = ψ + zγ + ν
Inequalities of educational achievement can therefore be decomposed into inequalities of school
quality, inequalities of pupil ability and background, and inequalities due to different social contexts,
for instance stemming from varying patterns of segregation. In the first period:
V ar(y1) = Cov(y, θ) + Cov(y, ϕ1) + V ar(ε1)
The first term is the component due to pupils’ differences in ability and background. It is the
sum of the heterogeneity in pupil ability and background, and the matching between pupil ability
and school-grade-year quality, i.e. Cov(y, θ) = V ar(θ) +Cov(θ, ϕ). The same decompositon applies
to school-grade-years, Cov(y, ϕ) = V ar(ϕ)+Cov(θ, ϕ). Hence, school-grade-year quality can widen
inequalities in test scores if (i) school-grade-years are heterogeneous (ii) good pupils – high-θ pupils
– are matched with good school-grade-years. Matching good school-grade-years to low-θ pupils
should reduce inequalities.
9
This match between good school-grade-years and low-θ pupils can take two routes: (i) by fos-
tering desegregation, i.e. decreasing Cov(γz, θ); and/or (ii) by matching high-ψ schools with low-θ
pupils.
2.5 Other Identification Methods Used in the Associated Literature
This section compares the identification strategy of this paper with the identification strategies that
have been introduced in past literature. We first compare our models to the value-added models
that are used in many papers on the measurement of school effectiveness. A seminal paper (Rivkin
et al., 2005) uses this model to emphasize the importance of teacher effects on academic achievement.
Finally, we compare the identification strategy of our paper to hierarchical linear models that have
flourished in the educational literature.
i) Value Added Models
In value added models, the outcome variable is the progress of the pupil rather than the absolute
test score. This basically corresponds to a dynamic panel data model in which the coefficient on
the lagged outcome is constrained to be equal to 1, i.e. λ = 1 in specification PIE. The results of
our estimations and of value added models are comparable.
A value added model would decompose the progress of the child into a child fixed effect, a
school-grade-year effect and a residual.
∆yi,f,t = xi,f ,t · β + θi + ϕJ(i,t),g(i,t),t + ui,f,t (4)
where ∆yi,f,t = yi,f,t − yi,f,t−1 is the progress of the child between two subsequent periods. Other
notations are as before. xi,f ,t is a vector of time-varying controls. There are two differences between
this model and specification PIE: (i) the value added model is more restrictive as it constrains the
effect of past achievement on current achievement so that λ = 1, and (ii) the error structure in
the value-added model is such that time varying unobservables can have long-term consequences on
achievement. Indeed, the value-added specification can be rewritten as:
yi,f,t = xi,f ,tβ + xi,f ,t−1β + 2 · θi + ϕJ(i,t),g(i,t),t + ϕJ(i,t−1),g(i,t−1),t−1 + ui,f,t + ui,f,t−1 (5)
This model is equivalent to specification PIE when λ = 1 and ui,f,t + ui,f,t−1 = εi,f,t. Thus value-
added models are equivalent to our model with a decay rate of 1, up to the error structure. Point
estimates should therefore be equal in both models. Our results reported below suggest that teacher
effects are robust to a range of decay rates λ. Thus estimated effects from the value added model
and our full model should be similar.
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ii) Teacher Effects: Rivkin et al. (2005)
Rivkin et al. (2005) specify an educational production function in which student value-added is
decomposed into a student effect, a school effect and a teacher effect. In our notation,
∆yi,f,t = θi + ψJ(i,t) + τT (i,f,t) + εi,f,t (6)
where ∆yi,f,t is the gain in student achievement of student i, in field f in year t. This specification
adds a teacher effect τT (i,f,t) where T (i, f, t) is the teacher of student i in field f in year t. In their
paper, Rivkin et al do not identify all the effects, but rather use this specification as a blueprint
and then estimate bounds for the variance of the teacher effects.
Specification (6) is remarkable in a number of ways. First, it does not include school-grade-year
effects. Second, it includes teacher effects, which is an addition to specification (SE) of our paper.
School effects ψJ(i,t) will not capture year-to-year variations of the student body, and the teacher
effect τT (i,f,t) is likely to include both time-varying teacher quality and year-to-year variations of
the student body that are correlated with changes in teacher quality.
iii) Metropolitan Area Fixed Effects: Hanushek and Rivkin (2003)
In Hanushek and Rivkin (2003), educational progress is decomposed into a family effect and a
metropolitan area fixed effect.
∆yi,f,t = θi + θi,t +MSAM(i,t) + εi,f,t (7)
where ∆yi,f,t is the gain in student achievement of student i in topic f in year t. MSAM(i,t)
is a metropolitan area fixed effect, where M(i, t) is the metropolitan area of student i in year t.
Estimation is carried out on Texas data, which contains 27 MSAs.
Three features of specification (7) are noticeable: first, student effects can vary over time;
second, school effects nor school-grade-year effects are present; and last, metropolitan area fixed
effects do not vary over time. These elements have the following consequences. Student time-
varying fixed effects are likely to capture other time varying inputs such as the metropolitan area
social composition. Metropolitan area fixed effects are likely to capture public good quality and
average school quality in the area, but not year-to-year variations of the social composition of the
area.
iv) Hierarchical Models for the Analysis of School Effects
Empirical work in education has used hierarchical linear models in several papers, notably in Rau-
denbush and Bryk (1986), Bryk and Raudenbush (1992), Goldstein (2002) or Rao and Sinharay
(2006). These models identify individual effects, school effects and potentially teacher effects using
only cross-sectional data. Despite its light data requirements, an important limitation of multilevel
modelling is that they nest individual effects, school effects and other determinants of educational
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achievement. Our model does not, since it uses pupil mobility to identify the effects. Multilevel
models are written as a set of specifications at multiple levels, e.g. a student level equation and a
school level equation. Equations are then combined to lead to a single specification.
Another drawback is that Raudenbush and Bryk (1986) and Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) specify
random effects and not fixed effects. The identification of random effects require the assumption of
strict exogeneity, which implies that, for instance, school effects are orthogonal to covariates and to
other random and/or fixed effects (Wooldridge, 2002, p257). It is likely that, for instance students
with a high or a low effect go to particular schools, or that schools with a good intake are particular
schools. Thus it is unlikely that the orthogonality between the effects and covariates is a realistic
assumption.
2.6 Estimation Method
The estimation of the model presented in this section cannot proceed in the same way as usual
Ordinary Least Squares estimation techniques. The number of right-hand side variables is the sum
J − 1 +N +K of the number of school effects, pupil effects and the number of covariates.5 Usual
packages try to invert the matrix of covariates which is time consuming and numerically unstable.
Abowd et al. (2002) have therefore developed an iterative estimation technique to estimate the
baseline fixed effects model of equation SE. However, specifications with past and current school
or school-grade-year effects required new identification proofs and estimation techniques.
The estimation proceeds in the following way: first, it starts by computing the variance-
covariance matrix of the model with dummies and covariates. This a large and sparse matrix.
Second, starting with a first guess for fixed effects and coefficients – usually zero –, the procedure
iterates by updating the approximate solution. The sequence of approximate solutions is obtained
by the conjugate gradient algorithm, that converges to the true solution if and only if the variance
covariance matrix is invertible; this requires that the mobility graph has one connex component
and that the covariates are linearly independent. More about the conjugate gradient can be found
in Dongarra, Duff, Sorensen and van der Vorst (1991). Details of the computation of the variance-
covariance matrix are given in Appendix B and these computation techniques have given birth to
a set of programs developed by the authors and are freely available on the website of the Cornell
Institute for Social and Economic Research.
3 Dataset and Estimation Method
3.1 The English Educational Context
The English educational system currently combines market mechanisms (many of which were in-
troduced in the Education Act of 1988) in different types of schools with a centralized assessment
operating through a National Curriculum (Machin and Vignoles, 2005). Therefore it has the ad-
5One school or school-grade-year effect is set to zero, one pupil effect is set to zero, and we add a constant.
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vantage of providing us with fairly different management and funding structures and, at the same
time, national exam results for all students.
The assessment system features a National Curriculum which sets out a sequence of Key Stages
through the years of compulsory schooling: in primary school Key Stage 1 (from ages 5 to 7) and
Key Stage 2 (from ages 7 to 11); and in secondary school Key Stage 3 (from ages 11 to 14) and
Key Stage 4 (from ages 14 to 16). At the end of each Key Stage, pupils are assessed in the core
disciplines: Mathematics, English and Science (not for Key Stage 1). These tests are nationally set
and anonymously marked by external graders.
The English primary schooling system is also characterised by a variety of different management
structures and funding sources. Community schools and voluntarily controlled schools, which cater
for more than half of the student body, are controlled by the Local Education Authority (LEA),
of which there are 150 in England. In the case of community and voluntarily controlled schools,
the LEA owns the buildings and employs the staff. On the other hand, in voluntary aided and
foundation schools, teachers are employed by the school governing body and the LEA has no legal
right to attend proceedings concerning the dismissal or appointment of staff.6 Funding also varies
across school types. While most state schools are funded by the government, voluntary aided schools
contribute around 10% of the total capital expenditure. These management and funding differences
are likely to generate various kinds of incentives, and thus different educational outcomes for pupils.
3.2 The National Pupil Database
The National Pupil Database (NPD) is a comprehensive administrative register of all English pupils
in state schools. Data is collected by the Department for Children, Schools and Families and it is
mandatory for all state schools to provide accurate data on pupils, who are followed from year to
year through a Pupil Matching Reference. Thus panel data can be built by stacking consecutive
years of the National Pupil Database.
The dataset provides rich information on pupils’ characteristics: gender, free school meal status,
special educational needs, and the ethnicity group. Pupils who receive free meals are the 15 to
20% poorest pupils. The ethnicity variable of our sample encodes the main ethnic groups: White,
Black Caribbean, Other Black, Pakistani, African Black, Mixed background, Bangladeshi, Indian,
Chinese, Other Background.7 It also provides some information on school structures and types (i.e.
whether they are community schools, foundation schools, voluntary aided or voluntary controlled
schools, and so forth).
Test scores in English, Maths and Science are available - the latter Science test only for Key
Stage 2. These tests are externally set and marked. We have standardized test scores to a mean of
50 and a standard deviation of 10 to make results comparable from one level to the other and from
year to year.
The structure of the panel data we have built from the NPD is shown in Table 1.
6Code of Practice on LEA Schools Relationships, DfES 2001
7Coding of the ethnicity variable has changed in the period we consider. It was therefore necessary to recode it in
a time-consistent manner.
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4 Main Results
We now come to the policy questions of the introduction: do schools matter? do peers matter? are
different schooling structures important?
4.1 Pupil, School and School-Grade-Year Effects
Do schools matter? Over the years, this question has been extensively discussed in the sociological
and educational literature as well as in recent papers in the economics of education (Rivkin et al.,
2005). Our new method of estimating school-grade-year effects and individual effects specifications
gives us a new opportunity to re-assess this important question, based upon the extremely rich
English data we study.
The estimation of specifications SE to PIE yields pupil fixed effects, school-grade-year effects
and school effects. School-grade-year effects are not available for the simple school effects model
(specification SE). Some very clear stylized facts come out from considering the correlations and
variances/covariances reported in Tables 4 and 5: (i) first of all, pupils are much more heterogenous
than either school or school-grade-years effects (ii) individual effects explain a much larger share of
the variance of test scores than school or school-grade-year effects.
The first key finding is of a higher variation of pupil fixed effects as compared to school-grade-year
effects and school effects can be seen from the Tables, where the standard deviation of pupil effects
is between 3.8 and 4.8 times larger than the standard deviation of school effects. Thus, perhaps
not surprisingly, suggests that pupils are more heterogeneous than schools. The same finding, of
a higher variation, is also true when comparing the standard deviation of pupil effects and the
standard deviation of school-grade-year effects. Nevertheless, pupil fixed effects are less precisely
estimated than school-grade-year effects or school effects. Indeed, at most five observations per
child are available whereas on average 250 observations per school-grade-year are available. To
address this potential issue, we look at the correlation between test scores and the school or school-
grade-year effects. Individual effects are imprecisely estimated but this should actually lower the
correlation between individual effects and test scores.8
The correlation between test scores and individual effects is seen to be between 0.79 and 0.83.
This is between 5 and 6.7 times larger than the correlation between school effects and test scores.
Indeed, the covariance Table 5 confirms the explanatory power of pupil effects to be much larger
than the explanatory power of school effects. This is no surprise given the high correlation, the low
variance of school effects and the much higher pupil heterogeneity.
Therefore these baseline results strongly suggest that pupil effects are a more important de-
terminant of test scores than school effects. How can one interpret these pupil effects? From our
perspective, it seems reasonable to think of them as picking up the whole range of educational ex-
periences before age 7: this includes parental background, childcare and kindergarten. Considered
in this way, the fact that pupil effects explain most of the variance of test scores is in line with some
8This, of course, holds provided measurement error is classical.
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of the important contributions to the recent economics of education research area (including, inter
alia, Heckman and Masterov (2007), Currie (2001) and Garces, Thomas and Currie (2002)).
4.2 Pupil Effects: Disentangling Individual Effects From Peer Effects and School
Quality
Of course, pupil effects can be correlated with a range of individual characteristics (like ethnicity,
gender, free school meal status, special needs and the child’s month of birth) and so an important
research challenge is to try to disentangle them from other factors like peer effects and school quality.
Doing so differs from an analysis of raw test scores since, under maintained assumptions, it looks
at pupil effects free of peer effects and free of the correlation between school quality and observable
characteristics.
From our analysis it is evident that pupil effects are reasonably well explained by observable
characteristics. For example, the R-Squared from regressions of the fixed effects on observable char-
acteristics is around 40% (Table 6). In these regressions, the estimated coefficients are remarkably
robust to different specifications. Moreover, the results are in line with descriptive statistics on test
scores. The pupil fixed effects of free school meal children are 40 to 41% of a standard deviation
lower. Family disadvantage is important, with free school meal pupils being the 10 to 20% poorest
children in England. Chinese pupils are the best performing pupils, with a fixed effect 16% of a
standard deviation higher than white pupils. Interestingly, Indian pupils have a lower fixed effect
than white pupils (6.4 to 7.8% of a standard deviation lower), whereas the test scores of Indian
pupils are higher than the test scores of whites. This suggests that basic descriptive statistics do
not disentangle the effect of ethnicity from the effect of peers and the effect of school quality. Finally,
male pupils have a higher fixed effect, by 2.5 to 2.6% of a standard deviation. This is certainly due to
the fact that regressions were carried out by pooling all subjects together. Boys in primary school
are better at mathematics and science, whereas girls are better at English. There are therefore
around three observations for which boys are better – maths in grades 2 and 6, science in grade 6
– and 2 observations for which girls are better – English in grades 2 and 69.
Table 6 confirms that pupil effects are well explained by observable characteristics, even if one
is unable to offer a causal interpretation to the reported findings. The coefficients in Table 6 prove
to be very consistent with basic descriptive statistics and, at the margin, this analysis allows us to
disentangle pure individual effects from the social context working through peers and school quality.
4.3 Effects of Social Composition on School Quality
As discussed in Section 2.3, the effect of the gender, ethnic and social composition of the school on its
quality can be identified under the assumption that year-to-year variations in school composition are
exogenous(Hoxby, 2000a; Hoxby, 2000b; Lavy and Schlosser, 2007). Two stylized facts emerge from
the covariances in Table 5 and from regressions of school-grade-year effects on school composition
9Another version of the tables, available upon request, discarded science test scores. Male fixed effects are then
not significantly higher.
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and school effects reported in Table 7: (i) the covariance between school-grade-year effects and test
scores is comparable to the covariance between school effects and test scores; and (ii) some of the
peer effects are significant but small – effect of the fraction of boys, free meals and special needs.
Overall, results suggest peer effects to be statistically significant, but relatively small in magnitude.
Looking at the covariances in Table 5 shows the covariance between test scores and school
effects to be very similar to the covariance between test scores and school-grade-year effects; 5.6 vs.
7.7 for the school-grade-year specification, 4.6 vs. 4.2 for the past and current school-grade-year
specification, and 4.7 vs. 4.0 for the full-fledged specification. Since school-grade-year effects can
be decomposed into the school effect and the effect of social composition, these figures imply that
peer effects are likely to be less important than school quality.
Table 7 shows estimates of the effect of the fraction of different social groups on school-grade-year
effects, separately for grade 2 and grade 6. In grade 2, in the full-fledged specification, increasing
the fraction of male students by 10% makes school-grade-year effects fall by 0.4% of a standard
deviation10 (Table 7, column 3). This effect is robust to different specifications. In grade 6, the
effect of the fraction of boys is positive, i.e. increasing the fraction of boys by 10 percentage points
increases test scores by 0.9% of a standard deviation (Table 7, column 6). The difference between
grade 2 and grade 6 gender composition effects is likely to be due to the fact that grade 2 exams
are in English and Maths, whereas grade 6 exams are in English, Maths and Sciences. Boys are
better than girls in both science and maths, but not better in English. This effect is robust to the
inclusion of past school-grade-year effects and past individual effects in the baseline specification.
Most papers in the literature find a negative effect of boys on achievement both in English and in
Maths, e.g. Hoxby (2000a).
The fraction of free meal children has a detrimental effect on school-grade-year effects in grade
6; increasing the fraction of free meal children by 10 percentage points lowers school-grade-year
effects by 0.7% of a standard deviation (Table 7, column 6).
In grade 6, ethnic composition has an effect on school quality. Chinese and Indian children exert
a positive contextual effect, black caribbean children exert a negative contextual effect. The effects
are large: increasing the fraction of chinese students by 10 percentage points increases fixed effects
by 4.6% of a standard deviation (table 7, column 6). These results are in line with the intuition
that being surrounded by high performing peers is good for your test scores; chinese children are at
the top of the test score distribution, and black caribbean children are at the lower tail.
Special needs pupils have a negative impact on achievement under the identification assumption.
Indeed, increasing the fraction of special needs students by 10% decreases school-grade-year effects
by 6% of a standard deviation. Other effects are not significant in grade 2. The contextual effect of
special needs students includes both the direct effect of interacting with special needs students and
the effect that goes through teachers’ and principals’ behaviour (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). Section
5 will look more closely at probing the identification assumptions.
10The standard deviation of test scores is 10.
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4.4 School Quality and School Structures
Are some schools better than other schools? Are schools that are organised under particular struc-
tures better than others? This is an important question, even if school quality explains a small
share of the variance of test scores, since there may be scope for improvement in the way schools are
structured. As has already been noted, English schools can have a variety of different organizational
structures. Some schools are able to hire and dismiss their staff, while in other schools the staff is
recruited and dismissed by the Local Education Authority (table 3).
The regressions shown in Table 8 do indeed show significant differences by school type. There
is evidence of beneficial effects of local recruitment of staff coupled with external control of the
school board. Indeed, in both grade 2 and grade 6, voluntary controlled schools perform worse than
community schools; like community schools, they cannot locally manage their human resources and
do not own their assets. The main difference with community schools is that they are mostly Church
of England schools.
Table 8 shows that voluntary aided schools, who can hire and dismiss staff locally, have a higher
school fixed effect in grade 6, by 3 to 4 % of a standard deviation. The effect is not significant in
grade 2 (table 8). Other types of schools can hire locally, e.g. foundation schools. These schools do
not have a significantly higher school effect in grade 2 and grade 6. But the board of foundation
schools is controlled by the Local Education Authority, whereas the board of voluntary controlled
schools is mostly controlled by the foundation. Broadly speaking, schools with a high fixed effect
recruit locally and the majority of their board is externally controlled by their foundation.
School management structures are not the whole story, though. The R-Squared of the regressions
of school effects on school type dummies is small, being not more than 1%, a finding in line with
the school effectiveness literature we cited earlier. There are therefore many other determinants of
school quality that, unfortunately, are not observed in the dataset we utilise.
4.5 Longer Run Effects of School Quality and Peers
Specifications PSGYE and PIE allow for some persistence of the effect of school quality, since past
school-grade-year effects are included in the determinants of test scores. In specification PIE, we
allow for a potential effect of the pupil’s background on the progress of the child. The discounting
factor therefore measures the long term effect of school quality and of pupil background on progress.
These two features matter as long as λ is nonzero.
λ is estimated by minimizing the sum of squared residuals. In specification PSGYE, which
include past school-grade-year effects, the decay rate λ is imprecisely estimated. Table 9 shows
the sum of squared residuals for a range of λs, from 0 to 0.9. For the 1998-2002 cohort and the
2000-2004 cohort, the optimal discounting factor is zero.11 For the cohort in-between, the optimal
discounting factor is 0.1. But a likelihood ratio test and its associated χ2 statistic reveal that it is
not possible to reject the hypothesis that λ is different from any value between 0 and 0.912. The
11Due to the large number of computations, we decided to estimate λ at a precision greater than 1/10.
12Under the null hypothesis that λ is equal to the optimal lambda, e.g. λ∗ = 0, the statistic 2 · ln(L(λ)/L(λ∗))
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good news though is that the school-grade-year effects and the pupil effects are robust to small
variations of λ around zero.13
The discounting factor is much more precisely estimated in the last specification (table 9). The
optimal discounting factor is 0 for the 1998-1999 cohort, 0.1 for the 1999-2000 cohort and 0 for the
2000-2004 cohort. Results indicate that on the whole the school-grade-year effect and individual
effect specification (equation PSGYE) is not rejected and fits the data as well as the last two
specifications. This is evidence that school quality and peer effects may have little long run effects.
This is consistent with Hanushek (2003) and with the notion that, for instance, reductions of class
size have small long term effects (Prais, 1996; Krueger, 1999). Similarly, Angrist and Lang (2002)
suggest that peer effects in the Boston METCO program were short-lived.
4.6 Pupil Mobility
Table 10 offers an analysis of patterns of pupil mobility. At this stage, it does not aim at checking
whether the identification assumptions required in our analysis are supported by the data. Rather,
that analysis is deferred to the next section of the paper. Instead, at this juncture, we wish to
provide some stylized facts about pupil mobility in English schools using the estimates of school
and pupil effects.
The table shows two main patterns worthy of discussion. First of all, pupil mobility in primary
school seems on the whole to be a feature of low performing pupils from low quality schools. Pupil
effects are negatively correlated with next period school effects and school-grade-year effects. In-
creasing the pupil effect by 10% of a standard deviation reduces the probability of moving by 0.3%.
And increasing the pupil effect by 10% of a standard deviation is correlated with a 0.5 % fall of the
next period school-grade-year and a 0.2% fall of the next period school effect. Free school meals
are more likely to move (line 5 of table 10). They also move to particular schools, i.e. other schools
than most pupils from their school. They move to lower quality school-grade-years (column 3). On
the other hand, they move to schools with a higher school fixed effect. This means that they tend
to go to schools with a worst peer group but better school quality.
The second main result is that disadvantaged ethnic backgrounds tend to move less than white
children and movers from these ethnic backgrounds tend to go to better schools than white chil-
dren. Bangladeshi pupils are 11.4% less likely to move than white children. Pakistani pupils are
6.8% less likely to move than white children and black caribbean children are 5.4% less likely to
move. Bangladeshi especially tend to go to better schools, next period school-grade-year effects are
higher by 15% of a standard deviation, school effects are higher by 12% of a standard deviation,
conditionally on the school effect and school-grade-year effect of grade 2.
converges to a χ2 statistic (Hoel, 1962).
13Results available on request.
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5 Robustness Checks and Further Discussion
In this section, we check present a number of robustness checks of our main finding, in particular
focussing on whether our identification assumptions are supported by the data. The identification
of school quality assumes at least sufficient mobility and exogenous mobility. The identification of
peer effects moreover assumes that year-to-year variations in cohort composition are exogenous. We
discuss these assumptions in the following subsections.
5.1 Do Children Move Enough to Generate Identification of the Model?
To separately identify pupil effects from school or school-grade-year effects, pupils have to move
between schools. More precisely the mobility graph as defined in section 2.2 should have one
connex component. Table 11 presents some basic statistics on mobility. Most pupils are followed
from Key Stage 1 to Key Stage 2. A sizeable proportion (42%) of pupils also change school between
grade 2 and grade 6. This is sufficient to generate only one mobility graph. The empirical question
of importance of whether students who move are actually different from pupils who do not move is
addressed in the following section.
5.2 Is Mobility Endogenous?
School quality and the effect of pupil background on achievement are estimated by comparing pupils’
test scores in different schools. It therefore requires that pupil mobility is not driven by unobserved
shocks that affect test scores, such as divorce, unemployment, and other family events. We argue
in this section that there is a credibly exogenous source of mobility. Indeed, some primary schools
only cater for key stage 1 pupils. Mobility is compulsory in this case. It proves important that
when the model is estimated on compulsory movers only, this paper’s results are not significantly
affected.
i) Why Endogenous Mobility may be a Problem
We design a small, simple model to understand why endogenous mobility may be a problem. In this
model, households experience unemployment shocks that are unobserved by the econometrician.
When a household experiences an unemployment shock, children change school and their test scores
are likely be lower.
The model is set up as follows. There are two periods. In each period, pupils’ parents can either
be unemployed ui,t = 1, or employed ui,t = 0. Test scores are determined by the following equation:
yi,t = θi + ψJ(i,t) − δui,t + ηi,t (8)
(8) is a school effect model. We restrict ourselves to a model with school effects for expositional
ease. yi,t is the test score of pupil i in year t. ψj is the school effect of school j. δ is the adverse
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effect of unemployment on test scores, and ui,t is a dummy for unemployment. ηi,t is a residual.
Unemployment shocks ui,t, i = 1, 2, t = 1, 2, are unobserved and the econometrician estimates
the following specification:
yi,t = θˆi + ψˆJ(i,t) + εi,t (9)
Assuming exogenous mobility, the estimated school effects ψˆj are estimated by OLS. To under-
stand the relationship between the structural effects and the least squares estimates, let us write
the specification in matrix form.
Y = Dθ + Fψ − δU + ε
with Y the vector of test scores, D the design matrix for pupil effects, θ the vector of pupil effects,
F the design matrix for school effects, ψ the vector of school effects, U the vector of unemployment
shocks and ε the residual.
The estimates are as follows:
θˆ = θ − δ(D′MFD)−1D′MFU (10)
ψˆ = ψ − δ(F ′MDF )−1F ′MDU (11)
where MD is the matrix that projects a vector on the vector space that is orthogonal to D. The
same logic applies to MF .
Thus the estimates of the individual effects and the school effects are biased whenever the
correlation between unemployment shocks and design matrices F or D is nonzero, that is, whenever
mobility is endogenous. When unobserved unemployment shocks (i) drive pupils to particular
schools and (ii) affect their test scores, the estimates of school effects and pupil effects are biased.
ii) Compulsory Moves as an Exogenous Driving Force of Mobility
Compulsory movers are children who move between grade 2 and grade 6 because their key stage 1
school does not cater for key stage 2 children. This mobility is likely to be more exogenous than
voluntary moves. However, there are three important conditions: (i) compulsory movers should not
be significantly different from non compulsory movers; (ii) as compulsory mobility is expected by
parents, we need to get evidence that key stage 1 only schools are not particular schools – either
better or worse schools; (iii) compulsory mobility provides us with a exogenous reason to move, but
it does not per se give an exogenous direction of mobility; children may still sort endogenously into
schools.
Table 12 shows descriptive statistics for compulsory movers, noncompulsory movers and stayers.
Genders, months of birth, languages and ethnicities are very similar between compulsory movers,
noncompulsory movers and stayers. Differences between the three categories appear in the fraction
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of special needs students and free school meals. The fraction of free school meal students is higher
among noncompuslory movers than among compulsory movers, but it very similar between com-
pulsory movers and stayers. On the whole, there are slight differences between the three categories
of mobility.
We therefore performed the estimation of specifications SE and PSGYE on compulsory movers
only14. Correlation tables (table 14) reveal that stylized facts are robust to the exclusion of noncom-
pulsory movers: (i) pupil heterogeneity is bigger than school heterogeneity and school-grade-year
heterogeneity (ii) the correlation between test scores and individual effects is bigger than the corre-
lation between test scores and either school effects or school-grade-year effects.
Pupil heterogeneity is similar in table 4 and in table 14. School-grade-year or school hetero-
geneity, while still smaller than pupil heterogeneity, is bigger in the school effects specification with
compulsory movers only (6.938 vs 1.941). This might be due to the smaller number of observa-
tions in the estimation with compulsory movers only. School effects heterogeneity is comparable in
the school-grade-year specification with and without noncompulsory movers. Stylized facts do not
change when estimating regressions with compulsory movers only.
The last issue we need to address is whether the direction of mobility is likely to be an iden-
tification issue. We define the most frequent school pupils go to. For each school j, the number
of pupils who move from school j to school j′ is computed. The most frequent school pupils from
school j go to in the next period is noted M(j). Among pupils who move, 63% move to the most
frequent school (table 11). This is mainly made up of compulsory movers. Therefore compulsory
movers mainly tend to go to the ’usual’ school, and the direction of their mobility is not likely to
be mainly explained by individual unobserved time varying variables.
5.3 The Identification of Peer Effects: Are Year-to-Year Variations in Grade
Composition Exogenous?
The effect of grade composition on school quality is estimated by looking at how year-to-year
variations affect school-grade-year effects. This actually requires that year-to-year variations in
grade composition are not correlated with other changes in school inputs, such as changes in teacher
quality and school funding. One way of addressing this identification issue is to compare year-to-year
variations to truly random variations around school average composition.
Formally, if changes in grade composition are truly exogenous, they must be some random fluc-
tuation around the average school composition. In a way identification relies on the idea that grade
composition in a given year is a finite size approximation of the school’s equilibrium composition.
Eˆ(z|j, g, t) = E(z|j, g) + uj,g,t (12)
Notations as before. Eˆ(z|j, g, t) is the empirical school-grade-year composition in school j, grade g
and year t. This is a vector containing the percentage of each ethnicity, the percentage of boys, free
14We also performed the estimations of the two other specifications, yielding similar results.
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meals and special needs. E(z|j, g) is average school composition across the three cohorts. The size
of the noise is approximately normal with variance around V ar E(z|j, g)/√nj,g,t.
The dataset only contains the empirical composition of grades. Therefore school average com-
position is just an estimate of the true composition.
Eˆ(z|j, g) = E(z|j, g) + vj,g,t (13)
with the size of the error term approximately V ar E(z|j, g)/√nj,g. Therefore, finally, Eˆ(z|j, g, t) =
Eˆ(z|j, g) + uj,g,t − vj,g,t.
Figure 2 compares the results of simulations to actual year-to-year variations in school-grade-year
compositions. For boys, free meals and three important ethnic groups year-to-year variations are
remarkably similar to random variations, as in Lavy and Schlosser (2007). This suggest that trends
in school-grade-year composition are not likely to explain the results of peer effects regression. On
the other hand, year-to-year varations in the fraction of special needs is bigger in the dataset than
what would be expected if it were purely random. There may be trends in the fraction of special
needs students in schools, which is likely to be due to evolving support for special needs students
in English elementary schools. Broadly speaking, apart from special needs students, variations in
gender and ethnic compositions are similar to random variations around average school composition.
5.4 What Can League Tables Tell Us?
The Education Reform Act 1988 set up the National Curriculum, which follows pupils through key
stages, as we pointed out in section 3.1. Since the early 1990s league tables have been publicly
available in England - for example, measures of performance at the end of each key stage are
now disclosed on the BBC’s website and through local newspapers. This is a crucial element of
transparency that is coupled with some leeway for school choice. Parents typically submit their
first three choices to Local Education Authorities in the fall of the academic year before enrollment;
most faith schools require a special application form.
Measures of performance are published in league tables. These league tables have become
increasingly more sophisticated over time. They currently reveal three pieces of information: (i) the
average test score at key stage examinations; (ii) the average value added of pupils in the school;
value added is the difference between the pupil’s test score in the previous key stage and his current
test score; finally, (iii) the average test score and value added in the local authority.
Are these elements informative about school effectiveness? The answer depends on the shape of
the education production function. It turns out that, using our models, neither absolute test scores
nor value added measures are good estimates of school effectiveness ϕ or ψ. In the full-fledged
model with non-zero decay rate and past inputs, the average test score of a school is a mixture of
school effectiveness, the average individual effect in the school and the average effectiveness of past
schools. Indeed,
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E[yi,f,t|j, g = 6, t] = (1 + λ) · E[θi|j, g = 6, t] + ϕj,g=6,t + λ · E[ϕj,g=2,t−4|j, g = 2, t− 4] (14)
where notations are as before. t is the year, g = 6 says that we are considering test scores in
grade 6. E[yi,f,2|j, g = 6, t] is the average test score in school j, grade g in grade 6. In two of the
three cohorts, the estimated decay rate is not different from zero. In this case, average past school
effectiveness disappears but the average individual effect remains. Therefore, unless two schools
have the same intake, the average test score is not informative about ϕ. Presumably this matters
for issues of school accountability.
How important is the contribution of individual fixed effects to school average test scores? Table
15 shows the decomposition of the between-school variance of test scores into its components. Most
of the variance of pupil effects is within schools (76%). There is however substantial between-school
variance of the pupil effects (24% of the variance of pupil effects). More troubling, the between-
school variance of individual effects is very close to the between-school variance of test scores.
This suggests that average test scores are a flawed measure of school effectiveness, provided our
specification is correct.
Value added measures are a means to get rid of these confounding effects. Average value added
is:
E[∆yi,f |j, g = 6, t] = λ · E[θi|j, g = 6, t] + ϕj,g=6,t + (λ− 1) · E[ϕj,g=2,t−4|j, g = 2, t− 4] (15)
where ∆yi,f = yi,f,2 − yi,f,1. E[∆yi,f |j, t] is average value added in school j, in a given year t.
Again, λ is close to zero in most cohorts, so that average value added is free of the individual
effects. However, average past school quality still enters the equation. It is a priori a problem since
the variance of school effects in grade 2 is comparable to the variance of school effects in grade 6.
Overall, neither average test scores nor average value added measures are a good proxy for school
effectiveness. It seems that more elaborate statistics are needed to truly help parents in accurately
determining their school choice decisions. The findings of our paper suggest that an index which
does not conflate pupil, school and peer effects and one that does not relate on value added could
be superior. Of course, there is a trade-off between the complexity of our approach to generate
measures and the ’simpler’ measures currently reported, but the estimates of school effects from
our approach can be calibrated into the information set of those with an interest in which schools
generate better performance for children.
Moreover, school effects are precisely estimated: the difference between the 60th percentile
school effect and the 40th percentile school effect is significant in all specifications, with a standard
error suggesting that our estimates could be used to differentiate school quality up to a percentile
point.15 This is in stark contrast with Chay, McEwan and Urquiola (2005) and Bird, Cox, Farewell,
15Bootstrap was performed to compute the standard error of the statistic ψP60 − ψP40. Block bootstrapping was
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Goldstein, Holt and Smith (2005), which find that average test scores and value-added are essentially
noisy measures.
5.5 Matching of Pupils to Schools
Results have shown that the most relevant specification is equation PSGYE. In this specification,
schools are equally effective for all students, that is, there is no complementarity between pupils
and schools. If the educational production function is truly specified as in specification PSGYE, the
model does not predict any particular matching of pupil effects and school effects at equilibrium.
Matching patterns are indeed determined by the complementarity between pupil effects and school
effects, following Becker (1973)16. In such a world, the model predicts zero correlation between
pupil effects and school-grade-year fixed effects.
However, some of the correlations between child effects and school effects in table 4 are negative.
Does it mean that pupils with a high pupil effect are structurally matched with low school-grade-
year effects? The correlation between estimated pupil effects and estimated school effects is actually
downward biased and we perform simulations to estimate the magnitude of the bias, suggesting that
the correlation is likely to be close to zero.
The correlation between estimated effects is downward biased. This has been pointed out in the
context of worker-firm matched panel datasets (Abowd and Kramarz, 2004). To make this clear, let
us decompose the correlation between child and school effects. This correlation can be written as
the sum of the correlation between measurement errors and the true covariance between the effects.
Cov(θˆ, ϕˆ) = Cov(θˆ − θ, ϕˆ− ϕ) + Cov(θˆ − θ, ϕ) + Cov(ϕˆ− ϕ, θ) + Cov(θ, ϕ)
where θ is the individual effect, ϕ is the school-grade-year effect, θˆ is the estimated individual effect,
ϕˆ is the estimated school-grade-year effect.
The estimation of Cov(θ, ϕ) therefore requires the estimation of Cov(θˆ − θ, ϕ), Cov(ϕ, θˆ − θ),
Cov(θˆ − θ, ϕˆ − ϕ). In general, the measurement errors of child and school effects are negatively
correlated (Abowd and Kramarz, 2004). The intuition behind this result is that (i) pupils who
change school get a better estimated effect but school effects are less precisely estimated (ii) pupils
who do not change school have a less well estimated effect but their associated school effect is more
precisely estimated.
Simulations can assess the order of magnitude of the downward bias of the correlation. We
generate pupil effects who have a normal distribution with the same variance as the estimated pupil
effects. We also generate school effects the same way. The point here is that pupil effects and school
effects are uncorrelated. We then generate simulated test scores using the specification with past
and current school-grade-year and individual effects.
used, with little difference on the size of standard errors. The difference ψP60 − ψP40 was 1.12 with a standard error
of 0.057 in specification SGYE.
16This of course, assumes a particular form of preferences and special market conditions. The housing market should
be perfect, parents should know the educational production function as specified in equation PSGYE and the only
reason for location decisions should be the level of test scores.
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Results are presented in table 16. Simulated pupil effects and school-grade-year effects were
generated using the variances of the last table of table 4. The results of simulations suggest that
even in the absence of a true correlation between pupil effects and school effects, the correlation
between estimated effects is negative. The correlation is −0.033. The empirical correlation is stable
across the three simulations. The correlation between school-grade-year and individual effects is
therefore likely to be close to −0.1, with school-grade-year effects explaining little of the variance
of test scores.
Generally speaking, estimating the correlation between pupil effects and school effects remains
a difficult challenge in pupil-school or worker-firm fixed effects specifications. Most papers find a
zero or negative correlation (Abowd and Kramarz, 2004; Abowd et al., 1999). But these papers do
not include a match effect that could account for the complementarity between pupil and school-
grade-year effects or worker and firm effect. The identification proofs of appendix A are not valid
in this case and more stringent identification assumptions are needed (Woodcock, 2007).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we consider a detailed econometric model which evaluates the importance of pupil
and school factors in determining children’s educational achievement. There are some parallels with
the by now large literature that estimates worker and firm effects from data matching workers to
firms. Here we match pupils to schools, using very rich adminstrative data on English primary
school children. We develop a set of econometric techniques that allow us to decompose childrens’
test scores into the effect of the background, the effect of the peers and the effect of the schools.
This is identified under general conditions of sufficient and exogenous mobility.
The main finding from this detailed econometric model is that pupil ability and background is
probably the most important educational input in that it explains a large fraction of the overall
variance. This suggests that either inherited ability, early educational experiences (acquired before
the age of seven) and family background play a very important part in the educational process.
School time-invariant inputs are the second most important input, but prove to be far less important
than pupil effects, provided the identification and specification of our models is correct. Peer
effects may be the least important input, most effects being small. The analysis of mobility reveals
that a substantial fraction of mobility is due to the structure of the English schools system where
compulsory mobility occurs at certain stages. This provides us with a reasonably exogenous source
of mobility. Results reveal that high achieving pupils either tend to stay in the same school, or to
go to the most usual school which students go to.
The findings of this paper should be useful to a number of audiences and research areas. First of
all, they do have clear implications for education policy and design. It is evident that pupil-specific
factors matter most, a conclusion also reached in other areas of the social sciences, through very
different modelling approaches (e.g. the ’school effectiveness’ literature in education research). This
throws doubt on the relevance of many simple measures of school effectiveness published on the
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internet and in local newspapers in many countries. Second, this paper applies and refines methods
from the literature on matched worker-firm data to pupils in schools. We think this is important,
providing strong evidence showing how economic agents (in this case pupils) behave and adapt in
the environment (in this case schools) in which they spend a considerable amount of their time.
It is very clear from our analysis (and from related ones like Rivkin et al. (2005)) that one gains
a lot from observing pupils in the schools they attend and we can say a lot more than a study
of educational achievement based only on pupils or only on schools is able to. Thirdly, and more
generally speaking, this paper estimates a full-blown specification with semi-parametric estimates
of pupil background effects, peer effects and school effects. It is the first paper of this kind to
include peer-effects and to include the effect of past schools(-grade-year) as current inputs. These
conclusions may be of substantial interest to policy makers seeking to spend public funding into the
right inputs either to increase efficiency or to narrow educational inequalities.
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A Appendix: Identification of The Current and Past School Ef-
fects Model
This section gives sufficient conditions for the identification of the student effects, school effects and
past school effects. The identification condition is an extension of Abowd et al. (2002).
We will start with the identification of the model and we will consider a continuous distribution
of students with a finite number of schools. A random mobility graph describes the movement of
individuals between schools. Schools are edges, individual mobility is represented by vertices. A
transition probability between two schools is defined as the probability that an individual belongs
to the two schools in two subsequent time periods.
A.1 Notations
There are T time periods t = 1, . . . , T . There is a continuum of individuals of density N , indexed
by i ∈ [0, N ]. There are J schools indexed by j ∈ J = {1, . . . , J}. We write that i ∈ j if student i
has attended school j in one of the periods t = 1, . . . , T .
We build a graph connecting schools in the following way. There is a connection between school
j and school j′ if the probability that a pupil belonged to both school j and school j′ is strictly
positive. Formally, (J , G) is called a mobility graph with J the set of schools and G the set of
vertices defined as follows:
{j, j′} ∈ G ⇔ P ({i ∈ [0, N ], i ∈ j, i ∈ j′}) > 0
j and j′ are connected if the probability that a student has attended both schools is strictly
positive.
A.2 Identification of the fixed effects conditionally on λ
We prove the following sufficient condition for the identification of school fixed effects. Let  ∈ J
be an arbitrary school and ı an individual who belonged to school . By convention, we set ψ = 0
and θı = 0.
Theorem 1 The school effects ψk of the connex component of (J , G) containing unit  are jointly
identifiable. The pupil effects of the individuals of the vertices of this connex component are all
jointly identifiable.
Proof It is sufficient to show that, for any pair of schools j and j′, if ψj is identified, and j and
j′ are connected, then ψj′ is identified.
If j and j′ are connected, one of the following equalities is satisfied:
Ei[(yi,t+1 − λyi,t)− (yi,t − λyi,t−1)|J(i, t+ 1) = j, J(i, t) = j′] = λ(ψj − ψj′) (A-16)
or
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Ei[(yi,t+1 − λyi,t)− (yi,t − λyi,t−1)|J(i, t+ 1) = j′, J(i, t) = j] = λ(ψj′ − ψj) (A-17)
Setting yi,0 = 0 by convention. It is clear from this relationship that when λ 6= 0, ψj′ is identified
implies that ψj is identified.
Since ψ is identified, and, for all j, j′ whenever ψj is identified and j and j′ are connected, ψj′
is identified, then by recursion the connex component containing ψ is identified.
We now turn to the identification of individual fixed effects. When a student connects two
schools whose school effects are identifiable, then the corresponding student effect is identifiable.
This shows that all student effects of the vertices of the connex component of ψ are identified. 
A.3 The identification of λ
Previous sections have given the conditions for the identification of the fixed effects when λ is given.
In this section, we assume that the mobility graph (J , G) of the dataset has one connex component,
and we put forward an iterated estimator for λ. Let βˆ(λ), θˆ(λ), ψˆ(λ) be the estimates of the fixed
effects conditionally on λ. y can be written as:
yi,f,t = xi,f ,tβˆ(λ) +
t∑
k=0
λkθˆi(λ) +
t∑
k=0
λkψˆJ(i,t−k)(λ) + ε̂i,f,t(λ)
A potential estimator for λ is given by maximizing the likelihood of the model conditionally on
the estimates. This assumes that errors are normally distributed and orthogonal across observations.
The proof of identification for λ can be found in Blundell and Robin (1999).
B Appendix: Estimation of the Model with Current and Past
School and Pupil Effects (Specification 4)
B.1 Matrix formulation of the Model
We write the specification in matrix form to get the normal form equations and proceed to the
estimation by conjugate gradient. The number of students is N . The number of schools is J . The
number of covariates is K. The number of observations in the ith period is ni, and n is the total
number of observations, n =
∑T
t=1 nt.
Y = Xβ +Dλθ + Φλψ + U (B-18)
with Φλ = F + λF−1 + · · ·+ λTF−T
Observations are ordered such that the vector of observations Y contains observations of the
first period, then the observations of the second period.
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Y = (Y ′1 |Y ′2 | · · · |Y ′T )′ Y ∈ Rn
Yi is a column vector with ni elements. The design matrix of individuals D is a matrix of n×N
elements. Again, I decompose the design matrix into a first period matrix and a second period
matrix.
Dλ = (D′1|(1 + λ)D′2| · · · |
T∑
k=0
λkD′k)
′ D ∈Mn,N (R)
The design matrices for units are linked. Indeed, if
F = (G′1|G′2| · · · |G′T )′ F ∈Mn,J(R)
Then
F−1 = (0|G−1′1 |G−1
′
2 | · · · |G−1
′
T−1)
′
F−2 = (0|0|G−2′1 |G−2
′
2 | · · · |G−2
′
T−2)
′
With these notations the identification hypothesis – namely that no unobserved time-varying
shock should be correlated with the covariates, student and/or school effects – can be translated in
matrix form, ie:
E(U |Dλ,Φλ, X) = 0 (B-19)
The normal equations follow:
X ′(Y −Xβ −Dλθ − Φλψ) = 0 (B-20)
D′λ(Y −Xβ −Dλθ − Φλψ) = 0 (B-21)
Φ′λ(Y −Xβ −Dλθ − Φλψ) = 0 (B-22)
Which can be written:
Aλb =
 X
′X X ′Dλ X ′Φλ
D′λX D
′
λDλ D
′
λΦλ
Φ′λX Φ
′
λDλ Φ
′
λΦλ

 βθ
ψ
 =
 X
′Y
D′λY
Φ′λY
 (B-23)
b is the parameter vector. Aλ is non-singular under conditions exposed in section 2. Moreover
Aλ is a symmetric, positive definite matrix, and therefore the problem of finding b can be solved by
the conjugate gradient algorithm.
Let us denote by ni,j,t the number of observations of student i in school j in year t.
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D′λDλ = Diag(n1,·,· + λn1,·,1, n2,·,· + λn2,·,1, . . . , nN,·,· + λnN,·,1)
F ′F = Diag(n·,1,·, n·,2,·, . . . , n·,J,·)
F ′−1F−1 = Diag(n·,1,1, n·,2,1, . . . , n·,J,1)
And,
Φ′λΦλ = F
′F + λF ′F−1 + λF ′−1F + λ
2F ′−1F−1
D′F = [ni,j,·]i,j D′F−1 = [ni,j,1]i=1,...,N,j=1,...,J
F ′F−1 = (0|G′2G1) G′2G1 = [mj,j′ ]j,j′=1,...,J
Where mj,j′ is the number of observations that move from unit j to unit j′ between period 1
and 2.
The estimation of the normal form equations uses a conjugate gradient estimator. Recursive
sequence b′n = (β′n θ′n ψ′n) is defined such that b0 = 0, and bn is built from bn−1 by the conjugate
gradient algorithm described in Dongarra et al. (1991).17
B.2 Estimating the discounting factor λ
The estimation of λ proceeds in the following way. Conditionally on the discounting factor λ,
previous sections have shown that we get estimates of the effects (θˆi(λ), i = 1 . . . N, ψˆj(λ), j =
1 . . . J, βˆ(λ)) by OLS. Two methods are feasible. Firstly, the model is linear conditionally on λ, and
therefore the identification method described in Blundell and Robin (1999) applies. Secondly, it is
possible estimate the parameter by minimizing the sum of squared residuals. This is justified in a
maximum likelihood framework with i.i.d. residuals.
17The conjugate gradient is mathematically an exact method. Due to rounding errors in the computational process,
it is practically an approximation of the true solution. The speed of convergence depends on the condition number of
matrix Aλ, ie the ratio of its highest eigenvalue and its lowest eigenvalue. Reducing the condition number increases
the convergence speed. This is the purpose of preconditioning. There are potentially many ways to precondition. In
the estimation, the Aλ matrix is multiplied by a diagonal matrix so that the diagonal is filled with ones.
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Key Stage 1 2
Age 7 11
Grade 2 6
Examination results in Maths Maths
English English
Science
School types Infant Junior
First or lower Middle
Primary Junior High
Infant & Junior
First & Middle
Primary
Cohorts 2000 2004
1999 2003
1998 2002
Table 1: The Dataset
Number Percentage
Male 4,413,066 ( 0.51)
Free School Meal 1,486,517 ( 0.17)
Special Needs 1,966,563 ( 0.23)
English spoken at home 7,893,062 ( 0.91)
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
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Dependent variable: Pupil Fixed Effect
Sample: Key Stage 1 and Key Stage 2
Specification
(SE) (SGYE) (PSGYE) (PIE)
Male 0.259** 0.256** 0.254** 0.255**
( 0.010 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.011 ) ( 0.010 )
Free School Meal -4.097** -4.080** -4.067** -3.987**
( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.015 )
Special Needs -11.268** -11.238** -11.287** -11.064**
( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.014 )
Month Of Birth -0.274** -0.276** -0.276** -0.268**
( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 )
Chinese 1.633** 1.567** 1.644** 1.622**
( 0.094 ) ( 0.096 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.095 )
Mixed 0.449** 0.395** 0.426** 0.415**
( 0.039 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.039 )
Indian -0.643** -0.777** -0.755** -0.733**
( 0.034 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.034 )
White Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Bangladeshi -3.124** -3.456** -3.429** -3.350**
( 0.058 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.058 )
Black African -1.794** -2.004** -1.930** -1.882**
( 0.048 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.049 ) ( 0.047 )
Pakistani -4.028** -3.993** -3.970** -3.874**
( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.035 )
Black, Other -0.855** -1.018** -0.965** -0.957**
( 0.073 ) ( 0.074 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.073 )
Other ethnicity -0.525** -0.587** -0.556** -0.529**
( 0.027 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.027 )
Black Carribean -1.540** -1.631** -1.571** -1.548**
( 0.045 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.044 )
R Squared 0.46 0.47 0.37 0.37
F Statistic 72,860.81 74,926.46 49,801.00 49,851.24
Number of Pupils 1,783,255 1,783,255 1,783,255 1,783,255
Source: National Pupils Database, Department for Education and Skills.
**: Significant at 1%. *: Significant at 5%.
Reading: Test Scores have a standard deviation of 10 and a mean of 50.
Table 6: Analysis of Pupil Fixed Effects
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Dependent variable: ϕj,g,t School-Grade-Year Effect
Grade 2 Grade 6
Specification (SGYE) (PSGYE) (PIE) (SGYE) (PSGYE) (PIE)
Fraction in Grade
Male -0.445** -0.395* -0.390* 0.777** 0.867** 0.906**
( 0.157 ) ( 0.181 ) ( 0.178 ) ( 0.162 ) ( 0.182 ) ( 0.185 )
Free School Meal 0.678** 0.536* 0.458 -0.465* -0.712** -0.660**
( 0.236 ) ( 0.257 ) ( 0.252 ) ( 0.230 ) ( 0.242 ) ( 0.246 )
Special Needs -0.171 -0.329 -0.586** -0.206 -0.290 -0.061
( 0.175 ) ( 0.198 ) ( 0.195 ) ( 0.163 ) ( 0.180 ) ( 0.182 )
White Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Chinese -2.063 -3.412 -3.233 5.128** 4.436** 4.577**
( 1.685 ) ( 1.790 ) ( 1.766 ) ( 1.645 ) ( 1.689 ) ( 1.712 )
Mixed -0.873 -0.954 -1.066 0.222 0.143 0.239
( 0.541 ) ( 0.586 ) ( 0.577 ) ( 0.526 ) ( 0.553 ) ( 0.562 )
Indian -0.490 -0.715 -0.619 1.965* 1.866* 1.816*
( 0.801 ) ( 0.857 ) ( 0.849 ) ( 0.787 ) ( 0.816 ) ( 0.832 )
Bangladeshi -1.802 -1.624 -1.481 0.223 0.387 0.463
( 1.763 ) ( 1.781 ) ( 1.773 ) ( 1.292 ) ( 1.275 ) ( 1.341 )
Black African -1.205 -0.830 -0.733 0.933 0.935 0.850
( 0.886 ) ( 0.934 ) ( 0.927 ) ( 0.744 ) ( 0.755 ) ( 0.762 )
Pakistani 0.521 0.350 0.470 1.314 1.242 1.347
( 0.818 ) ( 0.860 ) ( 0.844 ) ( 0.711 ) ( 0.717 ) ( 0.726 )
Black, Other 1.903 1.637 1.750 -0.020 -0.173 -0.390
( 1.020 ) ( 1.085 ) ( 1.070 ) ( 0.958 ) ( 1.002 ) ( 1.011 )
Black Carribean 0.649 0.467 0.593 -3.030** -3.195** -3.192**
( 0.841 ) ( 0.882 ) ( 0.875 ) ( 0.781 ) ( 0.798 ) ( 0.808 )
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R Squared 0.87 0.75 0.79 0.92 0.62 0.69
F Statistic 10,814.15 3,956.89 5,686.27 18,246.64 845.84 2,250.07
Number of observations 8,660,468 8,660,468 8,660,468 8,660,468 8,660,468 8,660,468
Number of school-grade-years 96,154 96,154 96,154 96,154 96,154 96,154
Number of schools 20,705 20,705 20,705 20,705 20,705 20,705
Source: National Pupils Database, Department for Education and Skills.
**: Significant at 1%. *: Significant at 5%.
Reading: Test Scores have a standard deviation of 10 and a mean of 50.
Table 7: Peer Effects in Schools – Analysis of School-Grade-Year Effects
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Dependent variable
Mover Moving to School-Grade-Year School
the most frequent school effects effects
Past School-Grade-Year Effect -0.003** 0.001** 0.563** 0.007**
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.001 )
Past School Effect 0.020** 0.018** -0.214** 0.341**
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 )
Past Pupil Effect -0.003** 0.001** -0.051** -0.023**
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
Male 0.000 0.001 0.034** -0.007*
( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 )
Free School Meal 0.032** -0.031** -0.148** 0.074**
( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.005 )
Special Needs -0.015** -0.002 -0.613** -0.319**
( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.005 )
Month Of Birth 0.000 0.001** -0.005** -0.004**
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.000 )
Chinese 0.014 -0.026** 0.492** 0.236**
( 0.007 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.037 ) ( 0.031 )
Mixed 0.007* -0.027** 0.320** 0.281**
( 0.003 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.016 ) ( 0.013 )
Indian 0.017** 0.039** 0.529** 0.009
( 0.003 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.011 )
Bangladeshi -0.114** -0.047** 1.509** 1.213**
( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.027 ) ( 0.022 )
Black African -0.038** -0.087** 0.823** 0.939**
( 0.004 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.022 ) ( 0.018 )
Pakistani -0.068** -0.010** 0.473** 0.136**
( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.012 )
Black, Other 0.011* -0.037** 0.295** 0.548**
( 0.006 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.026 )
Black Carribean -0.054** -0.057** 0.390** 0.803**
( 0.003 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.016 )
Number of observations 3,335,640 3,335,640 3,335,640 3,335,640
R Squared 0.01 0.01 0.52 0.16
F Statistic 1,019.03 1,289.69 71,912.88 8,117.50
Source: National Pupils Database, Department for Education and Skills.
**: Significant at 1%. *: Significant at 5%.
Reading: Test Scores have a standard deviation of 10 and a mean of 50.
Table 10: An Analysis of Mobility and the Direction of Mobility– Between Grade 2 and Grade 6
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Number of Pupils 1,783,255 pupils (100.00 %)
. . . with 2 years of observation 1,674,286 pupils ( 93.89 %)
. . . changing school 750,022 pupils ( 42.06 %)
Percentage of moving pupils
Compulsory move 546,800 pupils ( 72.90 %)
Non-compulsory move 203,222 pupils ( 27.10 %)
Changing School Type 199,868 pupils ( 26.65 %)
Changing LEA 112,592 pupils ( 15.01 %)
Moving to the most frequent school 473,231 pupils ( 63.10 %)
. . . among compulsory movers 423,995 pupils ( 56.53 %)
. . . among non-compulsory movers 49,236 pupils ( 6.56 %)
Compulsory movers: the pupil had to move, for his Key Stage 1 does not cater for Key Stage 2 pupils. Noncompulsory
movers: the pupil could have staid in the same school for both Key Stage 1 and 2.
Source: National Pupils Database, Department for Education and Skills.
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics on Mobility
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Cannot stay Can Stay in the Same School
in the same school Movers Stayers
Moving to the most frequent school 0.776 0.151 -
( 0.417 ) ( 0.358 ) -
Male 0.508 0.509 0.507
( 0.500 ) ( 0.500 ) ( 0.500 )
Month Of Birth 6.532 6.546 6.481
( 3.557 ) ( 3.574 ) ( 3.589 )
Special Needs 0.213 0.267 0.214
( 0.409 ) ( 0.442 ) ( 0.410 )
Free School Meal 0.156 0.244 0.156
( 0.363 ) ( 0.429 ) ( 0.362 )
English spoken at home 0.928 0.920 0.915
( 0.259 ) ( 0.272 ) ( 0.279 )
White 0.868 0.837 0.856
( 0.338 ) ( 0.370 ) ( 0.352 )
Black Carribean 0.010 0.017 0.014
( 0.101 ) ( 0.131 ) ( 0.118 )
Black, Other 0.004 0.007 0.004
( 0.064 ) ( 0.085 ) ( 0.067 )
Pakistani 0.022 0.021 0.026
( 0.146 ) ( 0.144 ) ( 0.160 )
Black African 0.008 0.019 0.012
( 0.087 ) ( 0.137 ) ( 0.107 )
Mixed 0.017 0.024 0.018
( 0.128 ) ( 0.154 ) ( 0.133 )
Bangladeshi 0.007 0.008 0.010
( 0.084 ) ( 0.089 ) ( 0.099 )
Indian 0.023 0.018 0.020
( 0.151 ) ( 0.132 ) ( 0.141 )
Chinese 0.003 0.003 0.003
( 0.050 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.051 )
Compulsory movers: the pupil had to move, for his Key Stage 1 does not cater for Key Stage 2 pupils. Noncompulsory
movers: the pupil could have staid in the same school for both Key Stage 1 and 2.
Source: National Pupils Database, Department for Education and Skills.
Table 12: The characteristics of compulsory movers, noncompulsory movers and nonmovers
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Dependent variable
Moving to School-Grade-Year School
the most frequent school effects effects
Past School-Grade-Year Effect 0.002** 0.357** 0.009**
( 0.000 ) ( 0.002 ) ( 0.002 )
Past School Effect -0.002** -0.178** 0.176**
( 0.000 ) ( 0.003 ) ( 0.002 )
Past Pupil Effect 0.004** -0.027** -0.013**
( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )
Male 0.000 0.021** -0.003
( 0.001 ) ( 0.006 ) ( 0.005 )
Free School Meal -0.070** -0.008 0.138**
( 0.002 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.008 )
Special Needs -0.003 -0.357** -0.195**
( 0.002 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.008 )
Month Of Birth 0.000** -0.000 -0.001
( 0.000 ) ( 0.001 ) ( 0.001 )
Chinese -0.038** 0.500** 0.239**
( 0.012 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.049 )
Mixed -0.038** 0.298** 0.217**
( 0.005 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.021 )
Indian 0.043** 0.754** 0.217**
( 0.003 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.016 )
Bangladeshi 0.059** 1.389** 1.120**
( 0.007 ) ( 0.051 ) ( 0.042 )
Black African -0.040** 1.061** 1.091**
( 0.007 ) ( 0.042 ) ( 0.036 )
Pakistani 0.057** 0.912** 0.486**
( 0.004 ) ( 0.025 ) ( 0.021 )
Black, Other -0.046** 0.274** 0.454**
( 0.010 ) ( 0.053 ) ( 0.045 )
Black Carribean -0.008 0.502** 0.747**
( 0.006 ) ( 0.035 ) ( 0.030 )
Number of observations 1,088,517 1,088,517 1,088,517
R Squared 0.01 0.51 0.06
F Statistic 354.06 30,877.63 1,494.92
Compulsory movers: the pupil had to move, for his Key Stage 1 does not cater for Key Stage 2 pupils. Noncompulsory
movers: the pupil could have staid in the same school for both Key Stage 1 and 2.
Source: National Pupils Database, Department for Education and Skills.
**: Significant at 1%. *: Significant at 5%.
Reading: Test Scores have a standard deviation of 10 and a mean of 50.
Table 13: An Analysis of Mobility and the Direction of Mobility for Compulsory Movers – Between
Grade 2 and Grade 6
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(a) Fraction Male (b) Fraction on Free School Meals
(c) Fraction of Special Needs (d) Fraction Chinese
(e) Fraction Indian (f) Fraction Black African
See section 5.3 for the description of the simulation procedure. Inspired by Lavy and Schlosser (2007).
Figure 2: Year to year variations in grade composition - Realized vs simulated deviations
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Overall Variance Between Schools Between LEAs Between School Types
Key Stage 1
Test Scores 99.006 16.172 1.094 3.475
( 100.0 %) ( 16.3 %) ( 1.1 %) ( 3.5 %)
Individual Effects 76.607 17.278 1.755 2.922
( 100.0 %) ( 22.6 %) ( 2.3 %) ( 3.8 %)
School-Grade-Year Effects 23.110 23.110 0.390 0.052
( 100.0 %) ( 100.0 %) ( 1.7 %) ( 0.2 %)
School Effects 5.560 5.560 0.406 0.039
( 100.0 %) ( 100.0 %) ( 7.3 %) ( 0.7 %)
Key Stage 2
Test Scores 99.259 19.339 1.080 5.195
( 100.0 %) ( 19.5 %) ( 1.1 %) ( 5.2 %)
Individual Effects 76.162 18.336 1.739 4.371
( 100.0 %) ( 24.1 %) ( 2.3 %) ( 5.7 %)
School-Grade-Year Effects 13.924 13.924 0.390 0.057
( 100.0 %) ( 100.0 %) ( 2.8 %) ( 0.4 %)
School Effects 5.160 5.160 0.406 0.044
( 100.0 %) ( 100.0 %) ( 7.9 %) ( 0.9 %)
Source: National Pupils Database, Department for Education and Skills.
**: Significant at 1%. *: Significant at 5%.
Reading: Test Scores have a standard deviation of 10 and a mean of 50.
Table 15: Decomposition of Variance
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– First Simulation –
Mean Std. Dev. y θ ϕ
y, Standardized grade 49.893 9.958 1.000
θ, Pupil Effect 0.000 9.271 -0.001 1.000
ϕ, School-Grade-Year Effect 2.187 6.008 0.012 -0.033 1.000
ε, Residual 17.198 26.010 0.113 0.000 -0.000
– Second Simulation –
Mean Std. Dev. y θ ϕ
y, Standardized grade 49.893 9.958 1.000
θ, Pupil Effect 0.000 9.277 0.000 1.000
ϕ, School-Grade-Year Effect 4.002 6.354 -0.011 -0.033 1.000
ε, Residual 17.201 26.010 0.113 -0.000 -0.000
– Third Simulation –
Mean Std. Dev. y θ ϕ
y, Standardized grade 49.893 9.958 1.000
θ, Pupil Effect -0.000 9.271 0.001 1.000
ϕ, School-Grade-Year Effect -2.960 6.664 0.020 -0.032 1.000
ε, Residual 17.216 26.027 0.112 -0.000 0.000
Source: National Pupils Database, Department for Education and Skills.
Estimated with a2group, a2reg, xtlreg and xtlreg2. Available through the corresponding author Amine Ouazad.
Reading: Test Scores have a standard deviation of 10 and a mean of 50.
Table 16: Correlation Tables – Simulations
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